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rn THI: SUPREME COURT 
OF 'LHE STATE OF U'LAII 
IDA U. STOKER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 16376 
KARL S. STOKER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPmlDEnT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The issue before this Court is whether Appellant may 
bring a personal injury lawsuit against her former spouse, 
Respondent, for an alleged assault i:vhich occurred during 
the period of their marriage, or whether such lawsuit 
is barred by the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. 
DISPOSITIOt~ rn LOWER COURT 
On March 9, 1979, Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted Res-
pondent's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact 
that Appellant's action was barred by the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity. Judge Hyde, ruling that a 
wife has no cause of action against a husband for a tort, 
negligent or intentional, occurring during the term of the 
marriage, dismissed Appellant's Complaint. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOlIGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of Appellant's Complaint on the grounds 
that this type of lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity. 
STATEMEi1T OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent were formerly wife and 
husband, having been divorced in ApriL 1976. On 
December 15, 1978, Appellant filed this action seeking 
damages for personal injuries suffered in an alleged 
assault by Respondent on December 25, 1975. The alleged 
assault took place while the parties were still husband 
and ·wife. 
On January 9, 1979, Respondent filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgnent, alleging that, even if Appellant could 
prove the facts stated in her Complaint, her action would 
be barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity. Respondent also argued that 
Appellant's action was barred by a Release she had signed 
in connection with the divorce settlement whereby she 
relinquished all claims she might have against Respondent 
arising out of the December 25, 1975 incident. 
The lower court, while finding that material issues 
of fact did exist concerning the validity of Appellant's 
Release, nevertheless granted Respondent's ~otion for 
Summary Judgment. Appellant's Complaint was dismissed 
for the reason that spouses or former spouses may not 
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sue one another for alleged tortious conduct which 
occurred during the period of the marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH LAW 
DOI:S NOT GIVE A PERSON A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAillST EIS OR 
HER FORMER SPOUSE FOR A TORT, NEGLIGENT OR INTEUTIONAL, 
OCCURRING DURING THE TEHN OF THE MARRIAGE. 
At common law it was clear that husbands and wives 
could not sue one another for wrongful acts committed 
during the perioci of their marriage. See 41 Am.Jur. 2d 
Husbands & \Jives §522 p. 443. The original rationale 
for this was based on the fact that the law regarded 
married persons as a single legal entity. Describing 
the effects of this concept, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
.. the wife was incapable of making contracts, 
of acquiring property or disposing of the same 
without her husband's consent. They could not 
enter into contracts with one another, nor 
were they liable for torts committed by one 
against the other. Thompson v. Thompson, 
218 U.S. 611, 614, 615 (1910). 
In response to the doctrine that married women had 
no independent legal rights, almost every state enacted 
some form of Married Women's Property Act in order to 
give wives certain additional legal rights. The ques-
tion before the Court in the instant case is whether 
the Utah Legislature has enacted specific statutes which 
change the common law interfamily immunity and give a 
woman the right to sue her former husband for a tort 
coITL.~itted during the period of the marriage. 
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The relevant Utah statutes are found in Sections 
30-2-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) and Sec-
tion 78-11-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). The ?ertinent 
sections read as follows: 
30-2-2. Contracts oay be made by a wife, and 
liabilities incurred and enforced by or against 
her to the same extent and in the same manner 
as if she were unmarried. 
30-2-4. A wife may receive the wa;es for her 
personal labor, maintain an action therefor 
in her own name and hold the sar.ie in her own 
right, and ~ay prosecute and defend all 
actions for the preservation and protection 
of her rights and property as if unmarried. 
There shall be no right of recovery by the 
husband on accou..~t of personal injury or 
wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected 
therewith, but the wife oay recover against 
a third person for such injury or wrong as 
if unmarried., and such recovery shall include 
expenses of medical treatment and other 
exoenses paid or ass~ed by the husband. 
78-11-1 .• ::::arried wo'.'lan oay sue and be 
sued in the same manner as if she were 
unmarried. 
If Appellant has the right to sue Respondent for an 
alleged tort cornnitted during their marriage, her right 
must flow from these statutes, since it is clearly a 
right she does not possess under the common law. By 
examining the three cases in which this Court has 
previously construed the impact of these statutes on 
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, it is evident 
that the lower court was correct in ruling that Appellant 
possesses no such right. 
It should be noted that the first time the Court 
considered this question, it concluded that the statutes 
-4-
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do allow a wife to sue her husband in tort. In Taylor v. 
Patten, 275 P.2d 696 (Ccah 1954), Justice Wade ruled that 
a woman could sue her former husband for an assault which 
occurred Hhile they were living apart during the inter-
locutory period of their divorce action. However, this 
Court later overruled the Tavlor decision in Rubalcava 
v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389, 394 (Utah 1963). In Rubalcava, 
Justice Crockett seems to have adopted much of the 
reasoning set forth by Justice Henriod in his dissent in 
Taylor. It thus becomes helpful to consider Justice 
Henriod's analysis. 
Justice Henriod points out that all ten of the sec-
tions of 30-2-1 through 10 deal with certain specific 
rights and obligations which a wife did not have at 
cowlllon law. He notes that, while there is no reference 
to tort liability of one spouse against the other, the 
sections specifically and clearly spell out the property 
rights and liabilities between spouses. This detailed 
enumeration of certain rights shows the legislature's 
intent to 11 • • • give a woman only those rights particu-
larized, which she did not have at common law, and not 
those Hhich were not specified. 11 275 P. 2d at 701. 
Focusing on the language of Section 30-2-2, he 
illustrates that it was only intended to refer to a 
,.1ife' s contractural rights. :'he word "liabilities" in 
that section deals only with contractural liabilities. 
He notes that 
-5-
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(i)f the section were intended to include torts 
and all other rights and liabilities . . all 
of the other 9 sections which obviously deal 
with specific and particular rights, which 
'.1ives did not have at common law, are composed 
of meaningless and wasted words. 275 P.2d 
at 701. 
Justice Henriod also states that 30-2-4 similarly 
does not confer upon a wife the right to sue her 
husband in tort. This section is intended to give a 
wife the right to keep her own wages and to seek, in 
her own name, damages for torts committed upon her by 
third persons. He points out that 
[n]othing is mentioned about any right 
against the husband. Certainly the sec-
tion does not clearly and soecifically 
give her any such right, but negatives 
any such right by allowing her to recover 
only against third persons. If the legisla-
ture had intended to give her a right 
against her husband, it simply could have 
said she could "recover against all persons" 
instead of against only "a third person." 
275 P.2d at 701, 702. (Emphasis in original.) 
The Justice concludes his opinion by pointing out that, 
while there may be some very good reasons for allowing 
a wife to sue her husband in tort, it is a w.atter for the 
legislature and not the court. 
The next Utah case to consider a spouse's ability 
to sue the other spouse in tort was Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 
supra. Here the Court ruled that a wife had no right 
to sue her husband's estate for injuries she suffered in 
a car accident in which the husband had been driving. 
The court again analyzed Sections 30-2-1, et. seq., 
together with Section 78-11-1, and concluded that they 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
do not give a woman the right to bring a tort action 
against her husband. Justice Crockett, writing for the 
majority, stated that statutes " ... expressly allow-
ing actions by the wife against the husband in respect 
to contract and property do not compel the conclusion 
that tort actions should also be included." 384 P.2d at 
391. 
Commenting on the effect of Section 78-11-1, Justice 
Crockett notes that this statute 
... is procedural, and serves only to 
give the wife the privilege of suing to 
protect whatever rights she may have but 
does not purport to create for her any 
new or substantive cause of action. Any 
such right would be found in Title 30, 
Husband & Wife, which particularizes the 
rights which they possess under our law. 
384 P.2d at 392. 
He then illustrates, as did Justice llenriod, that the 
specific rights given to married women in 30-2-1, et. 
seq. do not include the authority for a wife to sue her 
husband in tort. "Had the legislature intended that she 
have the right; it would have been set forth with the 
rest; and its omission fairly implies that no such right 
1Jas intended." 384 P.2d at 393. 
This Court again examined the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort inilllunity in Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1978). Tbe Court ruled that the doctrine did not 
bar a wrongful death action brought against the husband's 
estate by the heirs of the wife. However, the holding 
'Jas not based on an abrogation of the i=unity rule, 
-7-
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but was based on an interpretation of Utah's wrongful 
death statute. Finding that this statute created in the 
heirs a new, rather than a derivative, cause of 
action, the Court found that the action would lie 
despite the fact that the wife herself would have been 
barred by the ilIIIIlunity doctrine from brin~ing such an 
action. 
Justices Hall and Crockett, dissenting from the 
majority opinion because of their disagreement with its 
interpretation of the wrongful death statute, note that 
"[t]he Utah law is settled that a wife cannot maintain 
a tort action against her husband on his estate." 
577 P.2d at 107. The majority opinion in Hull would 
apparently also agree with this statement, for in the 
end of that opinion, despite its finding that a wife's 
estate can maintain such an action, Justice Maughan 
states that the decision makes no change in the inter-
spousal irm:lunity rule. This fact was noted by Judge 
Hyde in the instant case, where in his Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion for Sur:mJ.ary Judgt!lent, he stated 
that the "overall effect of the Rull case seems to 
reinforce the rule set out in Rubalcava." 
POINT II. JURISDICTIONS ANALYZING STATUTES sn11LAR TO 
UTAH'S AGREE THAT THEY DO NOT ESTABLISH THE RIGI-J:T TO 
BRING A TORT ACTION AGAE1ST ONE'S SPOUSE. 
In 1910 the United States Supreme Court interpreted 
a District of Columbia statute which stated that 
"(m)arried women shall have power to . sue sepa.ratel:· 
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. . . for torts cor:mitted against them, as fully and 
freely as if they '.vere unI'larried . . Thompson, 
~· at 617. The Court found that this language did 
not allow a woman to sue her husband in tort, but was 
intended to allow her to bring tort actions in her own 
name, thus taking away Llu: <..:uuuHu11 li:iw i:-ec.iuirement that 
such actions be brought in the joint names of herself and 
her husband. 
The Supreme Court recognized there are debatable 
policy arguments as to the Hisdom of the interspousal 
irmnunity rule, but said that any change in the rule must 
come from the le3islature. Had Congress intended to 
abrogate the doctrine, it could have written the District 
of Cohllilbia statute in such a way as to express " . . . 
that intent in terms of irresistible clearness." 218 U.S. 
at 613. Because it did not, the Court uas unwilling to 
read into the statute such a far-reaching change in the 
substantive law. 
In Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178 (3rd Cir. 
1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 919, a case in which a 
woman sued her husband for an intentional tort, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a statute 
almost identical to Section 30-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). The statute read "(c)ontracts ::iay be made 
bv a wife, liabilities incurred, and the same 
enforced by or a;sains t :1er in the same manner as if she 
were unmarried." 446 F.2d at 180. The court found 
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that this statute did not give the woman the right to 
maintain a tort action against her husband. i>Toting ti1at r;1, 
le6islature enacted this statute against the background of 
corn::on law tort immunity, the court reasoned that if the 
legislature had ir_tended to do away with i!r.munity, it would 
have stated it clearly. 
On similar grounds, the Montana Supreme Court ruled 
that a suit brought by a woman's heirs against her husband's 
estate was barred by the interfamily immunity doctrine. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Leary, 544 P.2d 
444 (Mont. 1975), the court dismissed the action despite 
the existence of a tA'.ontana statute giving a married woman 
the "right to sue or be sued as though she were single." 
Quoting from an earlier decision, the court stated that 
these statutes " . are ~rocedural and create no new 
rights, but only remove the colIIlllon law disability of 
married women to enforce their rights otherwise created 
and existing." 544 P.2d at 447, citing Dutton v. Hightower 
& Lubrecht Construction Co., 214 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D.C. 
Mont. 1963). 
In 1978, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Childress 
v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978) observed that it 
did not believe state statutes gave spouses the right to 
sue one another for torts occurring during the marriage. 
It is interesting to note that the language of the 
Tennessee statute is even broader than the Utah statutes, 
and the court still did not interpret it to abolish the 
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immunity doctrine. That statute reads 
.. every woman now married, or hereafter 
to be married, shall ~ave the same capacity 
to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy 
rtnd dispose of all property, real and person-
al, in possession, and to make any contract 
in reference to it, and to bind herself 
personally, and to sue and be sued with all 
the rights and incidents thereof, as if she 
were not married. 569 S,W.2d at 818. 
The Childress court did allow a woman to bring a tort 
action against her husband, but only because the tort 
occurred before they were married. Stating the cause of 
action had already been established prior to the marriage, 
the court limited its holding to that type of situation, 
and reaffirmed the fact that an action would not lie for a 
tort occurring during the marriage. 
Another case affi:nnin3 a woman's inability to sue 
her husband in tort is Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 
(l!o. 1972). Here a \Wmar. sued her ex-husband for injuries 
received in an auto accident which occurred during the 
marriage. The court dismissed the action, holding that a 
fon:ier wife could not recover damages, after the divorce, 
from her former husband for a wrongful act collllllitted during 
the marriage. See also Short Lin~ Inc. of Penn. v. Perez, 
238 A. 2d 341 (Del. 1968). 
The Ebel case is consistent with the general policy 
that, if the action could not be brought during the 
marriage because of the immunity doctrine, ti1e ~ere fact 
that the parties were divorced before the action was 
1ctually filed does not alter the fact that the suit is 
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barred. As stated in 41 An.Jur.2d Husbands and Wives 
§527 p.448: 
Where husband and wife are not liable to 
each other for torts committed by one 
against the other during coverture, they 
do not, on being divorced, become liable 
to each other for torts co!r.l!'.itted before 
the divorce .. 
Appellant cites a nunber of cases in her brief in 
which wives have been allowed to maintain tort actions 
against their husbands. However, the courts in these 
cases were not faced with the same statutory language 
which faces this Court. For example, in Coffindaffer v. 
Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W.Va. 1978), the court 
based its abolition of interspousal iillI!lunity on the 
following statute: 
A narried <voman !'lay sue and be sued ·without 
joining her husband in the following cases: 
. II. Where the action is between herself 
and her husband. 244 S.E.2d. at 339, 340. 
Moreover, in Coffindaffer the parties had separated and 
a divorce action was pending prior to the husband's 
tortious conduct. 
Again in Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 Ohl. 1978), 
another case relied on by Appellant, the court abolished 
the illlI!lunity doctrine by relying on specific statutory 
language which is not present in Utah law. In ruling 
that a woman could seek damages occasioned by her 
h~sband's intentional tort, the court utilized a Mary-
land statute which said "(m) arried women shall have the 
power to . . . sue . for torts committed against 
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them, as fully as if they were unmarried." 390 A.2d at 
79. 
Nowhere in the Utah statutes is there such a specific 
reference to a woman's ability to sue in tort. Section 
30-2-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953) mentions the ability 
of a wife to bring tort actions when it states " . . 
the wife may recover against a third person for such 
injury or wrong a.s if unmarried .... " (Emphasis added.) 
As noted by Justice Crockett in Rubalcava, supra, the 
plain ioport of this language is that a wife does not 
have the ability to sue her husband in tort. He stated 
that " . . the authorization to sue a third oerson 
clearly manifests that this section was formulated in an 
awareness that no right to sue the husband existed." 
334 P.2d at 393 (Emphasis in the original.) 
POH1T III. IF THE DOCTRIHE OF INTERSPOUSAL U1MUNITY IS 
TO BE ABROGATED B UTAH, SUCH CI-WIGE HUST COHE FROM THE 
LEGISLATURE, NOT THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. 
Much of Appellant's brief focuses on public policy 
reasons for doing away with the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity. These arguments are misdirected, for the 
actual merits or demerits of the iunnunity principle are 
not a proper subject of consideration in the instant 
forum. Justice Henriod aptly stated this in his dissent 
to Taylor v. Patten, supra, at 703: 
Everyone sympathizes with the beaten 
wife and abhors the wife-beater who almost 
invariably assumes not only th~ role men-
tioned, but that of a coward. If what plain-
tiff alleges be true, a bread and water diet 
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at an appropriate place for an extended 
period of time would be all too good for 
hi~. Concededly there seems to be little 
or no logical reason why a wife should be 
able to recover against her husband for a 
broken promise but not for a broken arm. 
However, it is for the legislature, not 
us, to give such a right. [!'l] o end of 
rhetoric or argument about public policy, 
archaic principles, protected property 
rights, obsolete fictions, historical sex 
equality, destruction of the purpose of 
marriage, and the like, can change the 
basic. . . (conclusion) . . that our 
statutes have given a wife no clear, 
specific right to sue her husband in tort, 
and that we must resort, therefore, to 
the common law, which denied her such right. 
The fact that change :nust co~e from t~1e legislature 
was re-asserted by Justice Crockett in the :najority 
opinion of Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 393, where 
he stated that". . any change . . . should be :nade 
by the legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all 
may be advised what the change is and when it will be 
effective." Similarly, in Hull v. Silver, supra, at 
107, Justice Hall wrote that "[i]f any change is to 
be made in the law it should be by legislative 
enactment rather than by judicial fiat." 
A recent Ohio case similarly refused to judicially 
overturn the immunity doctrine. In Varholla v. Varholla 
383 H.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1978), the court stated there are 
valid policy reasons for continuing the iIDI!lunity doctrine 
It promotes marital harmony by discouraging otherwise 
litigious spouses from pursuing real or fanciful claims 
to the detriment of the family unit. Additionally, it 
prevents fraud and collusion at the expense of tactica'.-
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disadvantaged insurance companies. Because the doctrine 
involves a matter of public policy, " ... changes in this 
area must emanate from the General Assembly, not the 
courts." 383 N.E.2d at 889. 
Additional support for the continuing validity of 
interspousal tort immunity, and the concept that any 
change must come from the legislature, can be found 
in the following cases: DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 
312 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1973); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 
142 (Fla. 1970); Horton v. Unigard Ins. Co., 355 So.2d 
154,155 (Fla.App, 1978). 
One final cormnent should be made on the arguments 
advanced in Appellant's brief. On p.18 she points to 
the Vtah Legislature's failure to ratify the Equal 
Rights Amendment as evidence of its belief that women 
are already fully emancipated in this state. Apparently, 
Appellant wants us to draw from this the conclusion that 
the legislature believes women already have the right 
to bring tort actions against their husbands. However, 
Appellant's argument is erroneous, for neither the 
proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment, nor the existing 
state equal rights provision (Utah Const. art. IV §1) 
have anything to do with the doctrine of interspousal 
tort irrnnunity. This doctrine applies equally to men and 
women, for while wives cannot sue their husbands for 
torts cormnitted in the marriage, neither can husbands 
sue their wives for tortious conduct during the course of 
the marriage. 
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
At common law, spouses clearly did not have the right 
to bring tort actions against one another for wrongful 
acts occurring during the course of the marriage. Be-
cause the Utah Legislature has never enacted a statute 
which confers such a right upon husbands and wives, 
such actions are still prohibited by the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity. The legislature itself 
nust make such a change before actions such as the one 
Appellant seeks to bring can be maintained in Utah. The 
lower court was correct in granting Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Respondent respectfully asks 
this Court to affinn the disnissal of Appellant's 
Complaint. 
DATED this day of August, 1979. 
Warner 
for Respondent 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
************-!<******** 
I hereby certify that on this ..._.(/;..,_~~- day of 
August, 1979, I mailed a copy of the foregoing brief, 
postage prepaid to Pete :L Vlahos, attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 2447 Xiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah. 
'1J~ _i T~1irs ton;ecretary 
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